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Integration or separation? The stigmatisation
of ex-combatants after war
JAREMEY R. MCMULLIN*
Abstract. Ex-combatant reintegration programmes are buttressed by a number of problematic
assumptions about ex-combatants themselves; namely, that ex-combatants should not receive
long-term support because such assistance would amplify the threat they pose to security and
exacerbate community resentment towards them. The article uses data collected from Liberia
to demonstrate that such thinking stigmatises ex-combatants and works against the objective
of reintegration: it disrupts integration into the everyday social, economic, and political life of
the post-conﬂict state and aims instead to render ex-combatants separate from communities.
Integration will remain elusive unless assumptions about ex-combatants as programme beneﬁ-
ciaries are challenged.
Jaremey R. McMullin is a lecturer in International Relations at the University of St. Andrews.
He completed his DPhil in International Relations at the University of Oxford and has pub-
lished research on post-conﬂict transition and ex-combatant reintegration in International
Peacekeeping, Third World Quarterly, and Civil Wars. He has also written reports on ex-
combatant reintegration in Liberia and Burundi for the United Nations Department of Peace-
keeping Operations.
Efforts to reintegrate ex-combatants after war occupy a privileged position in the
peacebuilding strategy of the United Nations and its implementing partners.1 The
2006 UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards
(IDDRS) state simply,
The sustainable social and economic reintegration of former combatants should be the
ultimate objective of [DDR]. If reintegration fails, the achievements of the disarmament and
demobilization phase are undermined, instability increases, and sustainable reconstruction and
development are put at risk.2
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1 United Nations General Assembly, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the
Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2 December 2004), A/59/
565, paras 227–8.
2 United Nations, Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (August 2006),
{http://www.unddr.org/iddrs} accessed 31 May 2011.
But policy documentation on DDR is located ﬁrmly within a problem-solving para-
digm, focusing on organisational issues such as coordination, fundraising, and inte-
gration between agencies instead of how to achieve sustainable social and economic
reintegration.3 Recently, an important critical literature has emerged, arguing that
elevation and codiﬁcation of DDR have glossed over contradictions, disagreement,
and confusion about its deﬁnition, components, and objectives.4 This literature also
demonstrates that DDR programmes often fall short of achieving their objectives
and have in some cases done more harm than good.5 Their conclusions cast doubt
over DDR as a policy tool and show that reintegration remains under-conceptualised
and under-theorised. Problems with DDR accordingly are linked to a broader ‘strategic
deﬁcit’ in peacebuilding.6
This article extends the critical debate over DDR to suggest that confusion over
the aims and objectives of reintegration, as well as programme failures, might be
linked to the stigmatisation of programme recipients themselves. Donors and agencies
are not just ill-equipped to assist ex-combatants after war; they are queasy about doing
so. The article hypothesises that the discourse and practice of DDR stigmatises former
combatants as ‘unworthy’ aid recipients. DDR, in this reading of ex-combatant reinte-
gration, is not under-theorised. On the contrary, dominant (if unintentional) narratives
of DDR reinforce problematic assumptions about ex-combatants, their character,
identity, and motivations. This article isolates and analyses two such narratives:7
A. A threat narrative, which portrays ex-combatants as inherently and naturally
threatening to post-conﬂict peace; and,
B. A resentment narrative, which emphasises the likelihood that communities will
resent assistance to ex-combatants, thereby portraying communities as more
deserving of aid than, and fundamentally distinct from, ex-combatants.
Both narratives ﬁlter the way in which the reintegration process is understood,
implemented, and conveyed. Both result in the exclusion of ex-combatants from
long-term aid, a consequence that is strangely at odds with the stated aims of DDR,
further differentiating ex-combatants from their communities when the goal is to
integrate them into communities. Well-intentioned implementers end up being suspi-
cious of the group they are called upon to assist, and that suspicion hinders the
integrative goal of DDR. To scrutinise the threat and resentment narratives, and to
3 This is true of peacekeeping and peacebuilding more generally: see Laura Zanotti, ‘Taming Chaos: A
Foucauldian View of UN Peacekeeping, Democracy and Normalization’, International Peacekeeping,
13:2 (2006), pp. 150–67.
4 Kathleen M. Jennings, ‘ ‘‘The Struggle to Satisfy’’: DDR through the Eyes of Ex-combatants in Liberia’,
International Peacekeeping, 14:2 (2007), pp. 204–18; Beatrice Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-politics of
Contemporary ‘‘Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration’’ Programs (Geneva: CERI and SGDN,
2004); Robert Muggah (ed.), Security and Post-Conﬂict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the
Aftermath of War (New York: Routledge, 2009); Robert Muggah, ‘No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspec-
tive on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-
conﬂict Contexts’, The Round Table, 94:379 (2005), pp. 239–52; and Susan Willett, ‘New Barbarians
at the Gate: Losing the Liberal Peace in Africa’, Review of African Political Economy, 32:106 (2005),
pp. 569–94.
5 Nat Colletta and Robert Muggah ‘Rethinking Post-War Security Promotion’, Journal of Security
Sector Management, 7:1 (2009), p. 2.
6 Kathleen M. Jennings, ‘Unclear Ends, Unclear Means: Reintegration in Post-war Societies – the Case
of Liberia’, Global Governance, 14:3 (2008), p. 332.
7 This list is not exhaustive but space constraints have led me to focus on what I see as the two most
common and hegemonic narratives.
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demonstrate how they inﬂuence reintegration policy in post-conﬂict states, the article
draws on empirical evidence collected in Liberia at the conclusion of the UN-
supported DDR process there.
Before analysing the way in which the threat and resentment narratives stigmatise
ex-combatants as aid beneﬁciaries, the article ﬁrst discusses the methodological and
theoretical framework underpinning the research and provides important contextual
background on successive conﬂicts in Liberia and the post-conﬂict peacebuilding
interventions implemented there. Then, section A of the article considers assumptions
about ex-combatants as security threats, showing how the post-conﬂict association,
unemployment, and character of Liberian ex-combatants have been constructed as a
priori destabilising to the Liberian state. Section B examines DDR narratives about
community resentment, focusing on constructions of post-conﬂict victimhood and
aid dessert and considering the stated preference of the UN and its partners for
‘community-based’ programming rather than programmes that target ex-combatants
only. The critical approach to ex-combatant reintegration suggested in Sections A
and B can have a destabilising effect on DDR in ways that could be more emancipa-
tory. Accordingly, the article concludes with a call to discursively recast ex-combatants,
envisioning them as capable of being productive and socially active agents after war
instead of unstable and unworthy beneﬁciaries of assistance.
Ex-combatants as a social category
Understanding how ex-combatants are constructed involves analysing what is written
and said about them, and interrogating the way in which discursive constructions
inﬂuence the practice of DDR. Methodologically, then, the article employs both
written and verbal texts. It performs a discourse analysis of the key policy documents
that have shaped reintegration design and implementation in Liberia. These are: the
IDDRS, the UN Development Programme’s ‘Practice Note’ on DDR, secretary-
general’s reports on the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), formal evaluations and
audits of DDR in Liberia, and UNMIL ﬁeld reports and assessments, including
the ‘Hotspots’ security assessments carried out jointly by UNMIL’s Reintegration,
Rehabilitation and Recovery (RRR) Section and Joint Mission Analysis Centre
(JMAC). Special emphasis is placed on the ways in which such texts frame ex-
combatants and communities. This analysis helps to demonstrate that the stigmatisa-
tion of ex-combatants is not simply due to poor implementation (that is, disjuncture
between policy guidance and practice in the ﬁeld), but that such stigmatisation is also
reinforced in these texts.
The verbal texts analysed are semi-structured interviews conducted over two trips
(in April 2007 and June 2009) with all major DDR practitioners in Liberia (donors,
UN ofﬁcials, NGOs, and Liberian governmental representatives) as well as with
community leaders, civil society representatives, and ex-combatants themselves. Inter-
views with practitioners were topical: questions were posed around clusters of ideas
(long-term versus short-term support; targeted versus non-targeted, or ‘community’-
based, programming; relationships between ex-combatants and communities; notions
of threat and security related to ex-combatants, and how programmes addressed
these; and conceptions of DDR and peacebuilding success). Space does not permit
an exhaustive breakdown of all respondents’ answers; rather, what emerged were
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common themes and ideas that I have isolated to articulate the dominant claims
of the threat and resentment narratives because these themes and ideas were: (1)
frequently mentioned; and (2) contested. Contestation was observed at different levels:
between respondents’ subjective interpretation of practice and the ‘textual record of
DDR’ (taken as the knowledge asserted in policy texts about ex-combatants); between
different practitioner respondents who had different points of view about whether,
how, and how long to help ex-combatants in post-conﬂict settings; and between sub-
jects (practitioners) and objects (ex-combatants) of DDR.
The latter form of contestation is particularly instructive to identify how and why
ex-combatants are constructed as unworthy beneﬁciaries of aid. The points of view
of both subjects and objects are needed to elucidate details about context and to
destabilise truth claims made about ex-combatants. My interviews included three
focus groups with ex-combatants: one in 2007 with young ex-combatants enrolled
in educational programmes in northern Liberia; one in 2009 with ex-combatant
members of the NCDDRR; and one in 2009 with ex-combatants who had occupied
the Sinoe Rubber Plantation but had subsequently been arrested and released without
charge by local authorities. Each group challenged ideas about ex-combatants in
Liberia that are taken for granted. All interviews with practitioners and ex-combatants
are treated anonymously, not only for ethical reasons to protect respondents from
retribution or criticism, but also in an attempt to move discursive analysis away
from a ‘he said, she said’ format – and its fascination with the identity, subjec-
tivity, or reliability of the respondent – towards an alternative presentation that
foregrounds contestation itself, emphasising problematisation of the threat and
resentment narratives.
The discourse analysis synthesises the narrative about ex-combatants and shows
how this narrative is presented as fact, as if ‘without history’ (‘all ex-combatants are
the same within and across contexts’). How have these constructions come about?
Who authors them? How are they allowed to persist and reproduce across contexts?
It then destabilises the narrative by allowing counter-claims and ideas to take the
stage.8 The synthesis isolates constructions of the ex-combatant (‘what kind of sub-
ject is being produced?’) and the critique helps to reveal the discursive and systemic
practices sustaining that production.9
Of course, the use of texts and interviews to problematise and critique DDR is
not without its limitations. Opinions and beliefs about ex-combatants are dynamic,
varied, and potentially inﬁnite. Just as the article seeks to upset the truth claims
made about ex-combatants, it would be unwise (and impossible) to present counter-
narratives and counter-claims as alternative ‘truths’. But that is also part of the
point. Discursive representation of ex-combatants, if one digs deep, is dynamic and
varied, yet the article demonstrates that some narratives are privileged over others, in
ways that negatively impact upon the objectives of integration.
Similarly, although the article’s focus on Liberia cannot be taken as universal or
transferable, the threat and resentment narratives nevertheless have tended to be
replicated across contexts. To mitigate in part the subjective limitations of the method
employed, the article cross-references data that use alternative methods; it supplements
8 Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-memory, Practice (New York: Cornell, 1977), pp. 139–40.
9 Peter Digeser, ‘The Fourth Face of Power’, The Journal of Politics, 54:4 (2002), p. 980; Michel
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Tavistock Publications, 1972), p. 49.
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textual analysis of my own data with available survey data collected by others. No
method could study and map the theory and practice of reintegration in its entirety,
but the method articulated here is aligned instead with critical methodological obser-
vation that seeks to ‘explore particular corners or strands within a speciﬁc institu-
tional complex in ways that make visible their points of connection with other sites
and courses of action’.10 The way in which ex-combatants are discursively constructed
is inﬂuenced by the related construction of combatants, political violence, the role of
natural resources in civil war, and changes in conceptions and interventions about
post-conﬂict justice, all of which involve the production of categories and assumptions
that, although already the subject of academic and policy critique, would beneﬁt
from additional scrutiny.
How and why DDR discourse frames ex-combatants
Theoretically, deconstruction and critique of ex-combatant framing borrow from
social constructivism, critical theory, and from an analysis of the concepts of dis-
ciplinarity and governmentality. First, establishing the category ‘ex-combatant’ as
a social construct is an important starting point for a fuller understanding of the
challenges of the reintegration process. As Durkheim argued, categories do not com-
municate social facts but are themselves socially constructed (that is, categories not
only express ‘social things’ but are also ‘social things’ themselves).11 The category
‘ex-combatant’ has meaning quite distinct from the former ﬁghters to whom it is
applied. In the broader sphere of peacebuilding, there is increased recognition from
practitioners and academics that nomenclature and semantics impact upon outcomes
and understanding of key concepts.12 International bureaucrats, politicians, and non-
combatant citizens deploy the label ‘ex-combatant’ as shorthand, epithet, identity
marker, and eligibility demarcator. Ex-combatants themselves adopt and eschew the
label situationally (to blend in, lobby, protest, apply for beneﬁts, gain acceptance,
and make sense of past and present life experiences). This multiple usage implies
that the category ‘ex-combatant’ has a rich and strategic meaning that is distinct
from the individuals who are said to belong to the universe described.13
Second, the article accepts critical theory’s insistence on examining and interrogat-
ing the post-conﬂict project. It isolates and interrogates the two narratives to inquire,
‘What purpose do they serve?’ To do so is to reject DDR as a neutral, technical
endeavour and alternatively iterate its fundamental contours as an ‘intensely political
process’,14 and by extension an ideological process ‘for someone and for some pur-
pose’.15 The analytical task of interrogating the origins and reasons for particular
10 Marjorie L. DeVault and Liza McCoy, ‘Institutional Ethnography: Using Interviews to Investigate
Ruling Relations’, in Dorothy E. Smith (ed.), Institutional Ethnography as Practice (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 2006), p. 17.
11 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 441.
12 Nat J. Colletta and Robert Muggah, ‘Context Matters: Interim Stabilisation and Second Generation
Approaches to Security Promotion’, Conﬂict, Security & Development, 9:4 (2009), p. 426.
13 Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1998 [orig. pub. 1952]).
14 Mats Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper No. 303 (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 5.
15 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’,
Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 10:2 (1981), pp. 126–55.
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framing of ex-combatants both reveals and problematises a gap between a public
transcript of ‘successful reintegration’ and a hidden transcript of the reintegration
process as a lived experience often and sometimes starkly at odds with ofﬁcial
assumptions and portrayals.16 To say that ex-combatants are dangerous, apolitical,
and resented is not merely to hurl insults. Rather, such assertions are the product of
broader assumptions about ex-combatants (and, I would argue, about people in the
global south) that are incubated, reinforced, and sustained through economic, social,
and ideological structures that are asserted to be natural and given but that ought to
be the subject of immanent critique.
Third, the concepts of disciplinarity and governmentality help to reveal how pro-
cesses of reintegration are not designed simply to assist ex-combatant beneﬁciaries
but to engineer them socially. DDR programmes seek to reward and punish particular
behaviours.17 DDR is not unique in this regard; the peacebuilding enterprise is struc-
tured as the transformation of disorderly states into orderly ones.18 The article builds
on this theoretical insight from the existing critical literature on DDR to demonstrate
how processes of disciplinarity and governmentality contribute to the stigmatisation
of ex-combatant beneﬁciaries by reinforcing ahistorical and apolitical understandings
of the referent (both ex-combatants and the communities absorbing them after war).
Not unlike Foucault’s despot, the ex-combatant is constructed as ‘the permanent
outlaw’ who represents a ‘bundle of threats’ unless he can be tempered by the post-
conﬂict state under international tutelage.19 DDR programmes limit the boundaries
of approved and unapproved activity, deﬁne ideal and deviant behaviour, and pro-
scribe acceptable expectations and ‘realistic’ aspirations for ex-combatants.
Before proceeding to a summary of the conﬂict and post-conﬂict context of Liberia,
two caveats are needed. First, the article does not suggest that stigmatisation of ex-
combatants is monolithic or petriﬁed. In fact, considerable evolution in DDR think-
ing and practice has occurred. The adoption of the IDDRS, the 2011 report of the
UN secretary-general on DDR,20 and recent academic literature drawing on evidence
from DDR programmes in several states21 all emphasise the importance of historical
and political context in designing reintegration programmes. Contextual distinctions
apply also to recognition that different types of combatants might require differently
tailored programmes (for example, government soldiers versus irregular or opposition
ﬁghters; armed combatants versus those who played supporting or auxiliary roles;
16 James C. Scott is the architect of the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘hidden’ transcripts, and a pro-
ponent of the need to destabilise the hegemony of public transcripts by: (a) testifying to the existence of
alternative, hidden transcripts; and (b) unveiling hidden transcripts and articulating their meaning in
opposition to public ones. James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).
17 Robert Muggah, Mats Berdal, and Stina Torjesen, ‘Conclusions: Enter an Evidence-Based Security
Promotion Agenda’, in Robert Muggah (ed.), Security and Post-Conﬂict Reconstruction: Dealing with
Fighters in the Aftermath of War (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 269.
18 Zanotti, ‘Taming Chaos’, p. 151.
19 Ibid., p. 152. Here, Zanotti cites Michel Foucault, ‘Lecture at the Colle´ge de France of 29 January
1975’, in Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni (eds), Abnormal: Lectures at the Colle´ge de France
1974–1975 (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 81–107.
20 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Report of the
Secretary-General’ (21 March 2011), A/65/741.
21 Colletta and Muggah, ‘Context Matters’.
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victorious versus vanquished; male versus female; adult versus child), and to the
recognition that reintegration can often be a highly subjective, individual process.22
Many practitioners inside and outside of the UN system also have successfully
argued that ex-combatants need more, not less, assistance, and have worked to design
and implement innovative, multidimensional, and context-sensitive programmes of
support for former ﬁghters (the follow-up programmes of UNMIL/RRR in Liberia
exemplify these traits). A critique of the ways in which problematic assumptions
about ex-combatants persist, therefore, should not be misinterpreted as a refusal
to recognise the ways in which peacebuilding thought and practice are dynamic. In
unmasking the dominance and persistence of certain problematic assumptions about
ex-combatants and contrasting those assumptions with observable counter-narratives
from a particular context, the article foregrounds ideas that are often absent from
stories about ex-combatants. The existence of these counter-narratives is subversive,
destabilising the category ‘ex-combatant’ and the truth claims made about it.
Second, the article’s critique is not intended to suggest that the ex-combatant
experience in Liberia is identical and transferable to DDR contexts elsewhere. There
is considerable variety in opinions about, and approaches to assisting, ex-combatants
(between, say, reintegration programmes designed by the UN and the World Bank).
Such variety necessarily limits and qualiﬁes the inferences that can be drawn from
the Liberian case; yet, the article will show that discursive constructions of ex-
combatants in Liberia have been inﬂuenced by an overarching (if ﬂuid) reiﬁcation of
a generic category, ‘ex-combatant’. The experience from Liberia could in the future
be compared with experience elsewhere in ways that might improve post-conﬂict
integration and reconciliation, and that might lead to further critical insights about
the way in which conﬂict and post-conﬂict actors are understood and assisted. The
article’s approach is consistent with complementary research on conﬂict actors argu-
ing that the analysis of ostensibly very different conﬂicts and combatants could yield
surprising insights into similarities.23
Ex-combatant reintegration in Liberia, 2003–9
From its founding in 1847 by freed slaves from America until 1980, Liberia was con-
trolled politically and economically by an Americo-Liberian elite. This elite violently
repressed and discriminated against the much larger, indigenous population. In 1980,
Samuel Doe overthrew President William Tolbert to become the ﬁrst indigenous
president but was himself overthrown by Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front
of Liberia (NPFL) in the context of a violent civil war that lasted from 1989 until
1997. The July 1997 elections established Taylor as president but in 1999, two anti-
Taylor movements, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
22 Chris Alden, Monika Thakur, and Matthew Arnold, Militias and the Challenges of Post-Conﬂict
Peace: Silencing the Guns (London: Zed Books, 2011); Joa˜o Gomes Porto, with Chris Alden and
Imogen Parsons, From Soldiers to Citizens: Demilitarisation of Conﬂict and Society (London: Ashgate
Publishers, 2007); Stina Torjesen, ‘New Avenues for Research in the Study of DDR’, Conﬂict, Security
& Development, 9:4 (2009), pp. 411–23; and Alpaslan Ozerdem, Post-war Recovery: Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration (London: I. B. Tauris, 2008).
23 David Keen, ‘A Tale of Two Wars: Great Expectations, Hard Times,’ Conﬂict, Security & Development,
9:4 (2009), pp. 515–34.
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and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), initiated a new civil war
that lasted four years. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in August 2004
between Taylor’s government, LURD, and MODEL ended the war. The 1989–1997
and 1999–2003 conﬂicts killed more than 200,000 Liberians and displaced many
more.
These two conﬂicts have, misleadingly, been characterised as a greed-fuelled
struggle for resources and one man’s (Taylor’s) destruction of the country. Both
conﬂicts, however, were fundamentally about issues of political representation in
the context of a long history of oppression of indigenous groups. Doe and Taylor
exacerbated pre-existing dynamics of ethnic favouritism and repression, and wars in
neighbouring Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Coˆte d’Ivoire added a regional dimension.
LURD, MODEL, and NPFL combatants committed massive violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law during the war, but were also playing out
a political struggle over security fears that were both national and regional, over the
right to be represented in and by the Liberian polity.24
The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) arrived in October 2003 to implement the
peace agreement and to lead DDR efforts, with reintegration programmes ending in
July 2009.25 Over 101,000 persons were disarmed and demobilised by November
2004, a great deal more than the 35,000 estimated based on projections of factional
troop strength. The large increase was the result of a joint UNMIL and National
Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
(NCDDRR) decision to loosen eligibility requirements. Beneﬁts included Transi-
tional Safety Allowance (TSA) payments and a ‘reintegration opportunity’ choice
between vocational training and formal education. Vocational training included
Monthly Subsistence Allowances (MSAs) of $30 per month for eight months. Formal
education involved three years of support, with MSAs of $30 per month for nine
months during the ﬁrst academic year, $15 per month for nine months during the
second, and no monthly support during the third year.
These programmes were scheduled to end in 2007 but a residual caseload of 7,000
ex-combatants had, through programming failures of implementers, not yet received
reintegration assistance, so a residual caseload programme costing US $7 million and
similar in design to the original programmes was launched in March 2008. UNMIL
also used the aforementioned Hotspots assessments to monitor residual threats
linked to incomplete ex-combatant reintegration. The Hotspots were initiated in
2005 to gauge potential ex-combatant reactions to the elections of that year. RRR
24 Morten Bøa˚s, ‘The Liberian Civil War: New War/Old War?’, Global Society, 19:1 (2005), p. 74. For
more background on successive Liberian conﬂicts, see: Republic of Liberia, Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Final Report, Vol. I, ‘Preliminary Findings and Determinations’ (2009), pp. 2–3, 48–53;
Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an
African Civil War (London: Hurst, 1999); Mats Utas, Sweet Battleﬁelds: Youth and the Liberian Civil
War (Uppsala: Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, 2003); William Reno, Warlord
Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
25 For more background on DDR programming in Liberia, see Jennings, ‘Unclear Ends’ and ‘Struggle
to Satisfy’; Jaremey McMullin, Lessons Learned Study: UNMIL Reintegration, Rehabilitation and
Recovery (RRR) Section: Lessons from DPKO Involvement with Ex-combatant Reintegration (New
York: UNDPKO, 2009); Andrea Tamagnini and Teresa Krafft, ‘Strategic Approaches to Reintegra-
tion: Lessons Learned from Liberia’, Global Governance, 16:1 (2010), pp. 13–20; Wolf-Christian Paes,
‘Eyewitness: The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Liberia’, Inter-
national Peacekeeping, 12:2 (2005), pp. 253–61; and James Pugel, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of
Ex-combatants in Liberia, February–March 2006 (Monrovia: UNDP, 2007).
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and JMAC produced seven Hotspots: October 2005, November 2005, April 2006,
April 2007, August 2008, January 2009, and May 2009. In addition, RRR and
JMAC undertook bi-annual missions, jointly with ONUCI, to monitor the involve-
ment of Liberian ex-combatants in Ivorian militias in Western Coˆte d’Ivoire. The
Hotspots linked monitoring to recommendations for follow-up programming. Due
in part to such recommendations, UNMIL/RRR, UNDP, and the World Bank
followed up the original and caseload programmes with road rehabilitation employ-
ment projects and alternative skills training (for example, from rubber tapping
to farming and ranching). Importantly, all follow-up projects included both ex-
combatants and non-combatant community members, and were implemented in
areas determined by UNMIL to be vulnerable (mainly rubber plantations and counties
located in border areas).
A. Armed, angry, and apolitical: the ex-combatant as threat
Although DDR practitioners have highlighted the importance of contextual differences
between distinct groups of ex-combatants, DDR discourse persists in asserting a
generic category of ‘ex-combatant’ that is allowed to apply to ﬁghting groups
in every context. In Liberia, such generalisation can be seen via the way in which
ex-combatants from the LURD, MODEL, and NPFL are aggregated, evaluated
as equally, inherently, and naturally threatening to post-conﬂict peace in Liberia.
Notwithstanding the increasing wariness of practitioners and academics to reduce
the causes of war or war recurrence to single, monolithic variables (for example, the
presence of natural resources), ex-combatants tend to be monitored and discussed
in terms of how their dissatisfaction could lead to war recurrence independent of
other variables that contribute to war, and independent of the extent to which ex-
combatant dissatisfaction might be linked to these other variables. These assumptions
about ex-combatants combine to produce a threat narrative in which the rationale
for reintegration is not the integration or reconciliation of particular post-war com-
munities and ex-combatants but the management and mitigation of ex-combatant
threats.
The origins of the threat narrative can be traced to the discourse of New Barbarism,
especially prevalent in news media framing of African conﬂict26 and in academic
studies and reportage of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone,27
26 See, for example, Neil MacFarquhar, ‘Angry Youths Become a Force in Darfur’, New York Times
(21 December 2008), A6.
27 Critics such as Richards and Peters were inspired to counter claims made in Robert Kaplan, The Coming
Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War (New York: Vintage, 2001). See Paul Richards,
Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey,
1996); Paul Richards (ed.), No Peace No War: Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conﬂicts
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005); Krijn Peters, Re-Examining Voluntarism: Youth Com-
batants in Sierra Leone (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2011); Jon Abbink and Ineke Van
Kessel (eds), Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics and Conﬂict in Africa (Leiden: Brill, 2005); and
Angela McIntyre, Kwesi Aning, and Prosper Addo, ‘Politics, War, and Youth Culture in Sierra Leone:
An Alternative Interpretation’. African Security Review, 11:3 (2002). Their work has subsequently been
the subject of further review and critique: see Ibrahim Abdullah, ‘Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin
and Character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone’, Journal of Modern African Studies,
36:2 (1998), pp. 203–35; Ibrahim Abdullah (ed.), Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone
Civil War (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004); and Florian Leuprecht, ‘Reading in Reverse: A Sociology
of Academic Knowledge about the War in Sierra Leone’, MA Thesis in International Studies and
Diplomacy, School of Oriental and African Studies (2007).
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which constructs young Africans as angry and irrationally violent. Critics of New
Barbarism have pointed out that such accounts ‘pay scant regard’ to insurgents’
own claims about the ideas and politics that might underlie their participation in
armed violence.28 New Barbarism internalises the causes of war (the angry violence
of young men, the corruption of individual leaders such as Charles Taylor), erasing
the role of regional and international dynamics and structures that fuel conﬂict
(international support and patronage, transnational small arms networks). For these
depictions of ex-combatants to resonate, the discourse must construct the wars in
which Liberians fought as unnecessarily violent, and simply unnecessary, an irrational
reﬂection of the violent urges of rag tag groups of angry men.29 The construct ‘war
in Liberia was not justiﬁed’ objectiﬁes ex-combatants as the authors of war (and the
sole authors of war). Illegal and inhumane as the means were, the Liberian conﬂicts
themselves were important vehicles of social reordering and transformation.30 Nor is
conﬂict in Liberia that aberrant: not unlike Western states,31 the Liberian state has
been made and remade via war.
The threat narrative can also be traced to the disciplinary and governmentalising
logic of securitisation. That peacebuilding ideology and interventions have become
increasingly securitised, particularly in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the US, is
well documented, particularly in terms of how underdevelopment and the instability
of post-conﬂict transition are presented as threats that could contribute to terrorism,
international criminality, or regional and international insecurity.32 Similar to the
ideological claims underpinning New Barbarism, the assumptions underlying this
securitisation also locate security threats domestically within failed states, concen-
trating the peacebuilding gaze inward. Outsiders thus frame security as a process
of taming, of both corrupt, domestic institutions and of unruly and criminal local
elements. An alternative is to balance interventions targeting the domestic and local
with reforms of the regional and international structures that shape, if not determine,
security for poor states. Just as the problem and need for intervention is interpreted
as originating nationally or locally, the solutions offered by top-down interventions
are conﬁned to the domestic sphere of the failed state. These solutions propose to
tackle the economic challenges of instability, insecurity, and state failure via a menu
of macroeconomic stability measures that are packaged as the ﬁscal sacriﬁces and
discipline needed to ‘ready’ the transitional state for mature, adult interaction in the
international system (disciplinarity), and security interventions that seek to increase
and consolidate state control over territory and population (governmentality).
This section analyses the ways in which these discourses come together to produce
and reproduce a threat narrative about ex-combatants, whereby all ex-combatant
activity is monitored in terms of the risk it poses to war recurrence. Their post-conﬂict
28 Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest, pp. xvi–xvii.
29 Ibid., p. xx.
30 Willett, ‘Barbarians’, p. 574; Morten Bøa˚s and Kevin C. Dunn, African Guerrillas: Raging against the
Machine (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), p. 5.
31 Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1985), p. 170.
32 Mark Dufﬁeld, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security
(London: Zed Books, 2004); Rita Abrahamsen, ‘A Breeding Ground for Terrorists? Africa and Britain’s
‘‘War on Terrorism’’ ’, Review of African Political Economy, 31:102 (2004), pp. 677–84; Paul D.
Williams, ‘Thinking about Security in Africa’, International Affairs, 83:6 (2007), pp. 1021–38.
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association, unemployment, even – counter-intuitively – employment are all construed
as security threats to the state. Additionally, dissent and protest about the nature of
the post-conﬂict project is conﬂated with a threat to return to war. The threats that
ex-combatant protests and dissatisfaction are said to pose are anchored to assump-
tions about ex-combatants themselves: their anti-social personalities and their lack
of education, ideology, and political beliefs. They are portrayed as irrationally and
barbarically violent, apolitical, greedy, and nihilistic. The wars they ﬁght in are
asserted to be unnecessary, and unnecessarily violent. And, after wars end, they are
said to gravitate naturally and seamlessly towards lives of crime.
Analysis of the threat narrative in this section will proceed in three parts: ﬁrst,
a look at how ex-combatants are said to be capable of returning a state to war via
violent protest or criminal banditry; second, an interrogation of the tendency of
DDR discourse to securitise ex-combatant association in all of its forms; and third,
an evaluation of claims that ex-combatant unemployment threatens the post-conﬂict
state.
Assumption 1. Ex-combatants return states to war
The notion that ex-combatant dissatisfaction can return a country to war has under-
pinned DDR programmes since their early post-Cold War inception.33 The UN
secretary-general asserted that ex-combatant dissatisfaction following the ﬁrst Liberian
civil war in 1997 led to remobilisation in 1999.34 But the exact sequence of events
that led from dissatisfaction to a full-scale return to war is left vague, as is the subject
of remobilisation; that is, to what extent were these the same ex-combatants, and to
what extent did they remobilise in similar groups to 1997? The ‘return to war’ claim
also relies upon a dubious causal chain. If ex-combatants cannot ﬁnd new livelihoods,
the claim asserts that they will protest violently or turn to crime to support themselves.
The claim conﬂates street protests with widespread political instability and conﬂict. It
pairs ex-combatant dissatisfaction with only one remedy (war-making) and univer-
salises the popularity of that remedy among all ex-combatants. A 2008 US Institute
of Peace survey found, however, that two-thirds of Liberian ex-combatants said they
would never go back to war.35 Another 2008 survey found that only two of 466 young
ex-combatant respondents said they would join an armed group if ﬁghting were to
resume, and only one said he would join a conﬂict in a neighbouring country.36 The
return to war claim disregards the deep scepticism that most Liberian ex-combatants
have about the future efﬁcacy of war.
The return to war claim also erases politics from war-making, and the role of
leaders in creating and sustaining wars. Although academics and policymakers under-
stand war to be a complex phenomenon that results from deeply rooted and more
33 Jaremey McMullin, ‘Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?’,
International Peacekeeping, 11:4 (2004), pp. 625–43.
34 UNSC, ‘Fifth Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia’ (17
December 2004), S/2004/972, para. 70; and, UNSC, ‘Eighth Progress Report of the Secretary General
on the United Nations Mission in Liberia’ (1 September 2005), S/2005/560, para. 15.
35 Richard Hill, Gwendolyn Taylor, and Jonathan Temin, ‘Would You Fight Again? Understanding
Liberian Ex-combatant Reintegration’, US Institute of Peace, Special Report. No. 211 (September
2008).
36 Morten Bøa˚s and Anne Hatløy, ‘ ‘‘Getting In, Getting Out’’: Militia Membership and Prospects for
Re-integration in Post-war Liberia’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 46:1 (2008), p. 51.
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proximate causes, DDR discourse tends to present a simplistic picture of war as
capable of being ignited through the ‘spiralling up’ of ex-combatant protests and/or
ex-combatant banditry and criminality. The suggestion that the disgruntlement of ex-
combatants in 1997 Liberia contributed to their subsequent remobilisation in 1999
fails to account for the policies of Charles Taylor, regional political dynamics, and
the issues of identity and representation that analysts of the 1999–2003 conﬂict
recognise as the precipitating and root causes of conﬂict. Re-recruitment into neigh-
bouring wars is also said to follow ex-combatant dissatisfaction. Re-recruitment,
however, does not mobilise ex-combatants into ‘any old conﬂict’ but rather into
already-existing conﬂicts that have their own history, causes, and protagonists. The
dissatisfaction of an ex-RUF combatant in Sierra Leone may have been a facilitating
cause of re-recruitment among some expatriate ﬁghters active in Liberian armed
movements, and cause of conﬂict exacerbation in Liberia, but not a cause of the
Liberian conﬂict itself. Research into reintegration dynamics elsewhere has proffered
a more nuanced approach, deprioritising the linear association between dissatisfac-
tion and war recurrence and instead emphasising how complex understandings of
combatants’ personal security inﬂuence whether reengagement with violence occurs,
or whether other, non-violent strategies are pursued.37
In the threat narrative, danger attaches to the ﬁgure of the ex-combatant because
DDR discourse biologically embeds violence in the character and disposition of ex-
combatants. The secretary-general has referred to Liberian ex-combatants collectively
as ‘a volatile group’.38 The lack of military discipline of the LURD, MODEL, and
NPFL, along with their indiscriminate targeting of civilians, is presented as demon-
strating a natural inclination toward barbaric violence. The narrative goes so far
as to imply that ex-combatants are the font of all violence, regardless of whether or
not it was initiated by ex-combatants: individuals who engage in violent intimidation
in Liberia, if they are not ex-combatants, are said in the Hotspots to demonstrate ‘ex-
combatant behavior’. The May 2009 Hotspot Assessment contains two references
to community ‘mimicry’ of ex-combatant violence. The ﬁrst discusses the use of
violence to gain control of rubber production on Guthrie plantation, and the second
relates to general violence within communities:
The rubber plantation workers were able to mobilize a substantial group of people most of
whom were not ex-combatants. These incidents illustrate that citizens without a combatant
background may have adapted a post conﬂict behavior and tend to react in ways considered
typical for ex-combatants.39
The past two decades of conﬂict have introduced violence as a common means of solving
conﬂicts in Liberian society. This type of post-conﬂict behavior can be observed not only with
ex-combatants but also with other citizens. As a result, citizens without combatant background
may act in a manner considered typical of ex-combatants.40
In these excerpts, violence is compartmentalised from the social, political, and economic
relations between, say, rubber workers and management, and is instead characterised as
37 Enzo Nussio, ‘How Ex-combatants Talk about Personal Security: Narratives of Former Paramilitaries
in Colombia’, Conﬂict, Security & Development, 11:5 (2011), pp. 579–606.
38 UNSC, ‘Eighth Progress Report’, para. 15.
39 UNMIL, May 2009 Hotspot, p. 6, emphasis added.
40 Ibid., p. 24, emphasis added.
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behaviour modelled on (and therefore authored by) ex-combatants. The consequence
is to conceal a long history of violence deeply embedded within Liberian society,
reinforced through regional and international support to exclusionary Americo-
Liberian regimes and through forms of violent economic organisation perpetuated
by international and domestic plantation ownership. Ex-combatants become not
simply inclined to violence; they are its font, its personiﬁcation. To present all com-
batants as naturally violent is not only ahistorical but ignores the overt and subtle
ways in which individuals during conﬂict, including those who were combatants,
resisted violence through escape, subterfuge, and non-compliance.41
The threat narrative also presents combatants as unstable elements by construct-
ing them as apolitical and greedy opportunists. In Liberia, numerous and apparently
contradictory shifts in factional allegiance from one conﬂict to another were pre-
sented as evidence of combatant opportunism rather than as a natural outgrowth
of the changing context of war.42 In reality, it is likely that fewer mercenary ﬁghters
existed than initially suggested.43 And assertions that Liberian combatants were greedy
opportunists do not hold up to closer scrutiny. Only 4 per cent of ex-combatants cited
‘money’ as a reason for ﬁghting in the conﬂict.44 Two major surveys conﬁrm that
security (for ex-combatants’ communities and families) was the predominant reason
why ﬁghters joined.45
The claim that ex-combatant criminality could ‘spiral up’ to threaten security in
the post-conﬂict state relies upon the assumption that ex-combatants naturally and
seamlessly turn to lives of crime after conﬂict. But in Liberia UNMIL found that
the non-combatant community is just as likely to resort to criminal enterprise.46
Liberia’s own TRC concluded that domestic and foreign businessmen and political
authorities, and not the ex-combatant rank and ﬁle, committed the most serious
economic crimes during the war.47 Associating ex-combatants exclusively with post-
conﬂict criminality thus disguises the role of external, and Western, actors in the
economic structures that sustain crime (trade routes, money laundering networks,
and transnational brokerage systems).48 Despite well-established complicity and
involvement of external actors in resource predation during the Liberian conﬂict,
UN-imposed sanctions focused on internal production and supply of timber, diamonds,
and rubber, and not the transnational and international networks that converted
resources into arms. Presenting wars in the global south as ‘criminal’ aberrations
and ex-combatants as uniquely crime-prone after war overlooks the long history of
criminal rent-seeking in all wars and neglects the ways in which criminality might
be deeply embedded in the system of international relations itself.49
41 Richard Maclure and Myriam Denov, ‘ ‘‘I Didn’t Want to Die so I Joined Them’’: Structuration and
the Process of Becoming Boy Soldiers in Sierra Leone’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 18:1 (2006),
p. 129.
42 Pugel, What the Fighters Say, p. 26.
43 Bøa˚s and Hatløy, ‘Getting In’, p. 44.
44 Pugel, What the Fighters Say, pp. 35–6.
45 Bøa˚s and Hatløy, ‘Getting In’; Pugel, What the Fighters Say.
46 UNMIL, May 2009 Hotspot, p. 3; UNMIL, August 2008 Hotspot, p. 2.
47 Republic of Liberia, TRC Vol. II, pp. 287–97.
48 Willett, ‘Barbarians’, p. 574.
49 Tilly, ‘War Making’, pp. 173, 184.
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Assumption 2. Ex-combatant association is threatening
The continued interaction of ex-combatant groups after war can sustain the violent
legacy of civil war. Vulnerable young combatants can ﬁnd themselves forced to pay
bribes to their former commanders, or to work for them without payment. Groups
of ex-combatants can intimidate local communities to consolidate commanders’
economic and political status after war. But even non-violent forms of ex-combatant
association, including collective economic ventures and formal and informal means
of social interaction, are constructed as threatening to the peace process because any
association is said to evidence ‘residual chains of command’ among ex-combatants.50
UNMIL conducted its Hotspots Assessments between 2006 and 2009 to analyse
the extent to which ex-combatant chains of command remained intact and threatened
state security after the war. UNMIL concluded that chains of command persist when
‘ex-combatants continue to take orders from their former commander on a daily
basis’.51 Its interest in monitoring ex-combatant chains of command was motivated
not only by the potential threats that quasi-mobilised ex-combatants would pose to
the state but also by welfare concerns for vulnerable ex-combatants trapped in social
structures leaving them open to manipulation and exploitation by former com-
manders. Although its initial estimation in 2006 was that persistence of command
structures was a problem, by 2008 UNMIL had concluded that no nationwide
networks existed among NPFL, LURD, or MODEL combatants. It also found,
however, that commanders often maintained contact with former subordinates along
personal, economic, and political lines.52
Although the Hotspots began with a narrow focus on the extent to which chains
of command constituted an ongoing threat to peace in Liberia, and although they are
careful to distinguish between national and localised forms of insecurity, the focus
of analysis in successive Hotspots tends to conﬂate ex-combatant visibility in com-
munities with mobilisation, and tends to present visibility as a prima facie threat.53
High levels of ex-combatant organisation in economic and youth groups are taken
as evidence that ‘chains of command could be activated and very quickly become
effective’.54 It is unclear, however, on what basis the assessments reach this conclusion:
how speciﬁcally do youth groups organised around trade and sport become ‘quickly’
mobilised for the purposes of violent conﬂict? There is no indication in the Hotspots
as to what speciﬁcally makes non-violent youth groups a potential threat, other than
the ‘alarming’ lack of respect they show to local authorities.55 This assessment is
curious given that, elsewhere in the Hotspots, not to mention most studies of pre-
conﬂict Liberia, local authorities are singled out for their long history of exploiting
and mal-treating youth, so an alarming lack of respect is unsurprising in context, and
50 Erin McCandless, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices
in Peace Operations: A Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities
for UN Peacekeeping (New York: UNDPKO, 2010), p. 26; UNDP, Practice Note on Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants (New York: UNDP, 2005), p. 43.
51 UNMIL, May 2009 Hotspot, p. 5.
52 UNMIL, ‘RRR & JMAC Hotspot Assessment: Ex-combatants and Chains of Command in Liberia’
(August 2008), pp. 1–2; UNMIL, ‘RRR & JMAC Hotspot Update’ (May 2009), pp. 5, 21.
53 UNMIL, August 2008 Hotspot, pp. 2, 5.
54 UNMIL, May 2009 Hotspot, p. 4.
55 Ibid., p. 11.
398 Jaremey R. McMullin
arguably exists within and because of a general legacy of abuses by security services
and other agents of authority.
The Hotspots often imply that the mere presence of ex-combatants within a
group becomes threatening. And they do so despite their own ﬁnding that ‘most’
organised groups in Liberia ‘mobilize as social security or economic network[s]
aimed at enhancing opportunities for trade in a certain area of commerce’.56 The
ﬁnal Hotspots Assessment concludes that ex-combatants were included in civil
society groups as ‘ordinary members of the community’ and ‘not because of their
combatants’ skills’ yet the same assessment then scrutinised these civil society groups
as threats simply because they included ex-combatants. It argues that any civil
society group, if ex-combatants or youth form part of it (which is, after all, an aim
of social reintegration), could ‘potentially be involved in incidents in the future’, and
listed numerous trade unions and youth groups as ‘likely future threats to public
order’.57 Not ‘possible’ threats but ‘likely’; association made synonymous with
mobilisation.
Independent surveys and international guidance on DDR mirror the Hotspots’
problematic constructions of ex-combatant association as threatening. A well-regarded
2008 survey found that 75 per cent of ex-combatants reported never going to their
former commanders for ﬁnancial aid or assistance, but goes on to say: ‘Troubling,
however, is the ﬁnding that 22% of the DDRR program completers sustain routine
ties compared against the sample’s population average of 14%.’58 The study does not
specify why this is ‘troubling’ – presumably it is that DDR itself can hurt demobili-
sation by giving ex-combatants incentives to stay in touch with former commanders,
an activity represented as per se dangerous. The 2005 UNDP Practice Note on DDR
argues that UNDP should ‘only support associations of ex-combatants that emerge
at the grass roots level within the context of the broader community’. More ‘national’
or ‘top-down’ associations risk perpetuating chains of command and individuals’
self-identiﬁcation as ex-combatants.59
Ex-combatants are sometimes sources of instability, but the threat narrative
presents them as likely or always threatening even in the face of evidence that they
are also sometimes sources of conﬂict management and resolution. Even when ex-
combatants worked to diffuse conﬂict in Liberian communities, the Hotspots present
such action as threatening. For example, the Hotspots observed that some com-
munity leaders approach former commanders to assist in problems involving ex-
combatants (delinquent loans, domestic disputes, public disorder) but then presented
such action in a negative light because it made ex-combatant leaders visible within
communities and usurped the primacy of the police.60 To assume a priori that associa-
tion is always potentially violent denies ex-combatants the potential for non-violent
association or agency over their own reintegration. Their association might sometimes
reﬂect a desire to discuss problems, pool resources and information, or lobby govern-
ments and international agencies. One ex-combatant on Sinoe rubber plantation in
Liberia told me, to the nods of dozens of others, ‘Ex-combatants need to address the
56 Ibid., p. 9.
57 Ibid.
58 Pugel, What the Fighters Say, p. 3.
59 UNDP, Practice Note, p. 38.
60 UNMIL, August 2008 Hotspot, p. 4.
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problems of reintegration together, especially employment.’61 The threat narrative
would securitise this assertion of a need for economic and political mobilisation.
The construction of association as threatening is speciﬁc to the global south. In
the global north, ‘veterans’ (semantically and ideologically constructed as distinct
from ‘ex-combatants’) can associate with one another without that association being
construed as a threat. They form lobbying groups to pressure their governments for
more recognition and assistance, and their mobilisation is constructed historically
as evidence of pressure group dynamics in democracy and civil society, even after
contexts of civil war and even if such lobbying results in violence.62 Of course, civil
war contexts and post-conﬂict transitions in deeply divided societies add dimensions
of inclusion and exclusion to different groups’ claims to rights of association. But the
actions of both ‘veterans’ and ‘combatants’ during and after war are often markedly
similar (the commission of atrocities during war and the post-war difﬁculties of
alcoholism, domestic violence, depression, suicide, crime, and violence) and yet,
despite similarities, rigid distinctions are maintained. The disjuncture involved in
construing any ex-combatant association as automatically threatening, evidence not
of pressure group politics but of residual chains of command, suggests that deep
scepticism of association is less a comment on the type and legacy of war context
confronted and more a judgment separating the ex-combatants of the global south
from the veterans of the north.
Assumption 3. Ex-combatant unemployment and employment are threatening
The secretary-general warned in 2004 that the threat posed by over 100,000 Liberian
‘unemployed, volatile and restive ex-combatants to security and stability in the country
and elsewhere must be taken most seriously’.63 Even though surveys ﬁnd the same
levels of unemployment among ex-combatants as the rest of the population, the ex-
combatant unemployed are presumed volatile and restive until proven otherwise.
Such framing is not unique to Liberia, and is especially common in literature on
child soldiers. Even though the overwhelming majority of unemployed African youth
do not ﬁght in civil wars, they are said to be ‘easily be absorbed into violence, whether
urban gangs, illicit business dealings, or rebel militias in new civil wars’.64
Discursive representations of unemployment as threatening confuse the signiﬁcance
of ‘unemployment as disenfranchisement and marginalization’ with ‘unemployment
as cause of war’. Unemployment and idleness matter a great deal but are not what
caused Liberian youth to take up arms in the conﬂict. Youth overwhelmingly cited
‘security concerns’ as the reason they chose to ﬁght.65 They did not trust the Taylor
regime to provide long-term security for themselves, their families, and their com-
munities. Nor were Liberia’s combatant youth idle or unemployed before conﬂict:
60 per cent were in school, and 25 per cent were working. Only 11 per cent reported
61 Author’s interview with ex-combatant, Sinoe Rubber Plantation, Sinoe County (10 June 2009).
62 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United
States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 111; Stephen Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus March
and GI Bill (New York: New York University Press, 2010).
63 UNSC, ‘Fifth Progress Report’, para. 70.
64 Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006),
p. 159, emphasis added.
65 Bøa˚s and Hatløy, ‘Getting In’, p. 50.
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having nothing to do.66 Even though idleness did not credibly cause a ‘return to war’
in 1999 it is asserted to be capable of causing conﬂict at some unspeciﬁed future date.
In a counter-intuitive twist of the threat narrative, it is not just unemployment
that is threatening. Employment is also constructed as a security threat, evidenced
in the discourse surrounding the emergence of motorcycle taxi drivers in Liberia.
Motorcycle taxi unions have sprung up around urban and semi-urban centres
throughout sub-Saharan Africa to ferry passengers who cannot afford to travel via
other means and over roads that are often un-passable in automobiles. In economies
where few sectors thrive, motorcycle taxis are booming.
The boom is not without a downside, and one that is sometimes violent. Drivers
have the reputation for being unsafe and for resorting to violence to resolve disputes
between rival unions or between drivers and authorities, passengers, and automobile
drivers. In post-conﬂict countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Burundi, motor-
cycle taxi unions tend to comprise many ex-combatant youth. In Liberia, the Bong
MTU’s 2900 membership is estimated to be 75 per cent ex-combatant. Because of
their ex-combatant membership, MTUs are constructed not as presenting solely
problems of public safety and order but as potential state security threats. Even
though land disputes in Liberia (usually involving non-combatants) are more
frequent and violent than incidents involving MTUs, ex-combatant membership in
motorcycle taxi unions is classed as ‘the greatest potential threat to public order’
and ‘an easy target for mobilization in the context of the 2011 elections’ in the May
2009 Hotspot.67 MTUs, according to this logic, are LURD and MODEL writ small.
MTUs have initiated violence against other MTUs and against the Liberian
National Police (LNP). On 27 February 2009, the Bong MTU staged a violent pro-
test in Gbarnga in reaction to the murder of one of its members and the perceived
lack of response by the LNP.68 The violence, according to UNMIL’s own reporting,
had nothing to do with the factional divisions of the conﬂict or the ex-combatant
status of its members but rather implicated the new post-conﬂict order (namely, the
perceived injustice of the LNP failing to respond to a murder in the community).
UNMIL analysis nevertheless locates the threat within MTUs and not the LNP,
even though the same assessment establishes that the LNP often behaves in a corrupt
or exploitative manner towards MTUs (charging MTUs protection money or bribes).
The paradox of framing MTUs as ‘the greatest potential threat to public order’ is
further ampliﬁed by evidence that, elsewhere in Liberia, MTUs and the LNP have
very good working relationships (some MTUs provide LNP ofﬁcials with free trans-
port in exchange for LNP-sponsored driver-training programmes). Furthermore,
several UNMIL/RRR respondents characterised the MTUs differently from the Hot-
spot Assessments in interviews, citing them as evidence of ex-combatant reintegration
and social and economic entrepreneurship. That the unions are also mixed between
ex-combatants and non-combatant youth was cited as evidence of positive social
reintegration.69 Given these nuances, the tendency for formal assessments of MTUs
to fall back on the threat narrative is problematic.
Contrary to the narrative’s elevation of ex-combatant threats, post-conﬂict vio-
lence in Liberia has taken on a variety of forms. Secretary-general’s reports detail
66 Ibid., p. 41.
67 UNMIL, May 2009 Hotspot, pp. 4, 12.
68 Ibid., p. 19; Tamagnini and Krafft, ‘Strategic Approaches’, p. 17.
69 Author’s interviews with UNMIL/RRR ofﬁcials, Monrovia (8–19 June 2009).
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politically motivated electoral violence, violence from vigilante groups in Duala
market in Monrovia, ritual killings and violent community reactions to ritual kill-
ings, and property and land disputes between ethnic groups.70 Threats speciﬁcally
linked to ex-combatants do not rank in the top four reported sources of conﬂict in a
2007 UNDP survey (these were bad leadership, crime and lawlessness, land disputes,
and unemployment and youth dissatisfaction). Even polygamy, ‘idleness’, and com-
mercial sex and prostitution were ranked as bigger sources of conﬂict within com-
munities than ex-combatant violence.71
This section has critiqued the threat narrative by showing, ﬁrst, that it overstates
the scale and scope of threats traced to ex-combatants. Second, its presentation of
ex-combatants is deterministic and neglects other threats to post-conﬂict communi-
ties from, for example, the state’s new security structures, political elites, and rubber
plantation owners. Third, it structures reintegration to construe success as negative
peace: success means the absence of ex-combatant violence and not the extent or
quality of integration. But most problematically, the post-conﬂict potential of ex-
combatants is reduced to threat, obscuring the possibility that after conﬂict some
ex-combatants are sometimes sources of social capital and agents of reconciliation
and reconstruction.
B. Community angels and combatant demons: the ex-combatant as object of resentment
While the threat narrative has its origins in assumptions about African civil wars and
the securitising discourse of peacebuilding, the resentment narrative can be traced
to developments within the ﬁeld and practice of transitional justice, which tends to
portray DDR as effecting ‘tradeoffs’ between security and justice, and to distinguish
ex-combatant perpetrators from community victims. Pablo de Greiff has explained
that a discourse of tradeoffs is inevitable if justice is construed in abstract terms of
‘promoting justice’, which comes to mean ‘giving everyone his or her due’ rather
than as the process of achieving two ‘mediate goals’ (building recognition and trust)
and two ‘ﬁnal goals’ (reconciliation and democracy).72 The language of tradeoffs
might also disregard the extent to which ‘justice’ can be portrayed as an unproble-
matic good, when it essentially is an umbrella term involving processes that are
contested, such as democracy, rule of law, and reconciliation.73
Tradeoffs also construct a hierarchy, where transitional justice efforts are portrayed
(intentionally or not) as morally superior to DDR processes. In an earlier work, de
Greiff, Ana Cutter Patel, and Lars Waldorf frame the relationship between DDR
and transitional justice in their edited volume with these words: ‘DDR programs are
seldom analysed to consider justice-related aims; and transitional justice mechanisms
70 UNSC, ‘Eighth Progress Report’, paras 15–24.
71 Pugel, What the Fighters Say, p. 61.
72 Pablo de Greiff, ‘A Normative Conception of Transitional Justice’, in Dealing with the Past, Politorbis
No. 50 (2010), p. 18. Elsewhere, de Greiff treats this similar theme, arguing that ‘the idea of compen-
sation in proportion to harm as an unproblematic criterion of justice’ ought to give way to a concep-
tion of ‘three goals which are intimately related to justice, namely, recognition, civic trust, and social
solidarity’: Pablo de Greiff, ‘Justice and Reparations’, in Pablo de Greiff (ed.), The Handbook of
Reparations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 451–77.
73 Christine Bell, ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘‘Field’’ or ‘‘Non-Field’’ ’,
International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3:1 (2009), pp. 5–27.
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rarely articulate strategies for coordinating with DDR.’74 At ﬁrst glance, this com-
plaint reﬂects a common refrain in the literature on peacebuilding, that practitioners
working on discrete peacebuilding tasks do not always synchronise and integrate
their approaches. But the juxtaposition also sets up a semantic and discursive distinc-
tion between DDR and transitional justice, which implicates DDR more than transi-
tional justice: DDR fails to contemplate ‘justice-related aims’ whereas transitional
justice is guilty of a lesser crime of ‘non-coordination’ with DDR. ‘Justice-related
aims’ are the value underpinning transitional justice but parallel ‘DDR-related aims’
are absent in the tradeoff. DDR is stripped of its integrative aims via its presentation
as lacking an underlying logic or value beyond security objectives.
The discipline and practice of transitional justice focuses analysis on the perpe-
trator, and by comparison neglects to problematise notions of ‘victimhood’ and
its subsequent and reﬂexive association with ‘communities’. For legal and political
reasons, justice interventions are rationalised in terms of targeting those ‘most re-
sponsible’ for crimes against humanity and war crimes. Legal instruments and con-
ventions codify protections for non-combatants from abuses by combatants during
war and so contribute to the creation of distinct categories of perpetrators and
victims. The result has been to frame violence in hierarchical terms that do not
always correspond with bottom-up perceptions, especially among youth, of how
violence existed prior to war,75 and among both ex-combatants and non-combatants
about the sources and nature of violence after war. The authors of transitional justice
narratives construct competing and mutually exclusive categories where wars produce
perpetrators or victims. Such assumptions become reproduced within DDR processes,
where discourse reiﬁes distinctions between ex-combatants and communities when in
fact, blurry lines separate these two groups, and the goal of reintegration is in any
case to relax the distinction.
Distinguishing between ex-combatants and communities is not a neutral project:
communities are characterised as progressive actors that are the double victims of
combatant violence during war and ex-combatant threat, violence, and criminality
after war. Such characterisation is not new. Ex-combatants have been an unpopular
beneﬁciary group since DDR programmes were ﬁrst internationalised in the early
1990s. Initially, such programmes were pitched to donors and host countries in terms
of a peace dividend, said to take the form of the ﬁscal savings states would see as a
result of cutting military expenditures via demobilisation, savings that could then be
spent on social services to promote peace.76 The peace dividend rationale framed
DDR from its inception not as a societal good in and of itself but as something that
had to be justiﬁed to donors and post-conﬂict states in terms of its tertiary beneﬁts,
as if assisting former ﬁghters was so unpalatable an act that only an appeal to the
ﬁnancial bottom line would persuade.
74 Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo de Greiff, and Lars Waldorf, Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and
Ex-Combatants (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2010), back cover.
75 Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, ‘ ‘‘Why We Fight’’: Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone’,
Africa 68:2 (1998), pp. 183, 210; and Maclure and Denov, ‘I Didn’t Want to Die’.
76 For an early articulation of the peace dividend, see Mac Graham, Richard Jolly, and Chris Smith,
Disarmament and World Development (London: Pergamon, 1986); and Kees Kingma (ed.), Demobiliza-
tion in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impacts (London: MacMillan Press Ltd.,
2000), p. 24. For evidence that peace dividend rhetoric persists, see World Bank, MDRP Final Report:
Overview of Program Achievements (Washington, DC: World Bank, July 2010), p. 14.
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But such distinctions have taken on a new discursive formulation that ﬁxes the
unpopularity of ex-combatants as aid beneﬁciaries and can be traced to the late
1990s: that communities resent the DDR assistance ex-combatants receive because
such assistance unfairly assists perpetrators of violence. Certainty about the existence
and salience of community resentment was absent from programme evaluations of
early 1990s DDR interventions (for example, Mozambique) but following DDR support
to the violent and unpopular RUF in Sierra Leone the concept became entrenched,
ubiquitous, and linear (resentment is community resentment of ex-combatants). There
are 25 references to community resentment in the IDDRS. In contrast, Liberia’s Truth
and Reconciliation Final Report conceptualises resentment as taking heterogeneous
forms. Resentment is mentioned four times, but only one of these discusses community
resentment of ex-combatants.77 Two discuss youth resentment of traditional and ageist
hierarchies as an important cause of conﬂict,78 and the remaining reference discusses
general political and ethnic resentment.79 The assumption that resentment always
ﬂows from one direction, from communities to ex-combatants, obscures the dynamic
and multi-directional manifestations of the processes for which resentment is merely
shorthand: anger, defeat, responsibility, and expectation.80
The resentment narrative is discursively linked to the threat narrative explored in
the previous section: resentment should be minimised because it could ‘lead to war’ –
‘favouritism causes exclusion, exclusion causes war’.81 Two principal assumptions
underpin it. First, communities are victims of ex-combatant violence (the perpetrator
thesis). This assumption relies on the myth that communities are innocent victims
during and after war, and that ex-combatants are collectively guilty: all of them are
perpetrators of human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against humanity during
the war and violent intimidation of communities after the war. In this way, the resent-
ment narrative is linked to New Barbarism because it frames the actions of ex-
combatants as inherently and inevitably barbaric without being politically motivated
or meaningful.
The second assumption is that communities are more deserving of assistance after
war because it is unfair to give ex-combatants special treatment not afforded to non-
combatant communities (the community dessert thesis). ‘Why should ex-combatants
beneﬁt from DDR while communities receive nothing?’ is a common refrain among
practitioners and civil society representatives. The dessert thesis relies on the myth of
a binary opposition between ex-combatants and communities. These assumptions
lead to a third component of the resentment narrative – the increasingly ﬁxed prefer-
ence in DDR discourse for ‘community-based approaches’ and corresponding con-
tempt for ‘targeted approaches’. This section explores these aspects of the resentment
narrative (that ex-combatants are perpetrators, that they are less deserving of assis-
tance than communities, and that community-based approaches to reintegration are
preferred). It also seeks to destabilise and problematise them by providing counter-
narratives and counter-evidence.
77 Republic of Liberia, TRC Vol. III Title II, p. 72.
78 Ibid., p. 57.
79 Republic of Liberia, Vol. III Title VII, p. 14.
80 See de Greiff, ‘Normative Conception’, pp. 25–6. On these pages, de Greiff refers to Margaret Urban
Walker, ‘Resentment and Assurance’, Moral Repair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006),
p. 146.
81 Stephen Archibald and Paul Richards, ‘Converts to Human Rights? Popular Debate about War and
Justice in Rural Central Sierra Leone’, Africa, 72:3 (2002), p. 360.
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Assumption 1. Ex-combatants are perpetrators
Resentment towards ex-combatants for receiving beneﬁts is asserted to be inevitable
and to exist prior to ex-combatant return to communities after war. The UNDP
Practice Note asserts that ex-combatants are ‘likely to be perceived as perpetrators and
additional burdens on the community, rather than as an asset’.82 The Practice Note
goes further, arguing that resentment of ex-combatant perpetrators can irreparably
harm reintegration:
Civilian resentment at the special treatment of ex-combatants can become an impediment to
successful and lasting reintegration. A key objective of the DDR programme must therefore be
to ensure that all stakeholders understand that DDR is not about rewarding ex-combatants
(except in the very speciﬁc case of wars of liberation, where ex-combatants are perceived as
heroes).83
In the resentment narrative, there is no room for community solidarity with ex-
combatants, except in ‘the very speciﬁc case of wars of liberation’. The IDDRS
modify the Practice Note’s determinism by arguing that ‘special treatment to ex-
combatants may cause resentment among other groups who may view special or
unique beneﬁts to ex-combatants as an unjustiﬁed reward to the perpetrators of
conﬂict’.84 The argument nevertheless represents a decontextualising appeal to prob-
ability (because something could happen, it inevitably will happen).
The perpetrator thesis asserts collective guilt among all ex-combatants for the war’s
atrocities and ascribes collective future guilt to all ex-combatants in its aftermath
(they will turn to crime, they will pick up arms again if disappointed ). A common
dehumanisation strategy, the assertion of collective guilt justiﬁes the community’s
fear and jealousy of them. Discursively, then, it is consistent for a UN report on
employment generation to refer to ‘[e]x-combatants and victims alike’,85 as if the
opposite of an ‘ex-combatant’ is not a ‘non-combatant’ but is instead and self-evidently
a ‘victim’.
The perpetrator thesis presents resentment as existing prior to DDR, ignoring the
ways in which the contours and duration of DDR themselves might shape and con-
struct resentment. For example, negative experiences with cash payments in Sierra
Leone led some donors to oppose cash reinsertion payments in Liberia. The lesson
became, ‘Cash creates resentment.’ But in Sierra Leone resentment can be traced
not to cash per se but to the programmatic modes of its dispersal: it was given at
disarmament sites and not in communities of return, and was given in exchange
for weapons or ammunition, which fuelled a market for small arms. In other cases
(Mozambique, Liberia, and Burundi, for example) cash was not given in direct
exchange for weapons and was spread out over several months in communities of
return, minimising the problems encountered in Sierra Leone. Whether communities
resent cash payments is also related to the success of information and community
‘sensitisation’ campaigns about the rationale and potential community gains of cash
assistance to former ﬁghters.86 Other programmatic choices can similarly help to
82 UNDP, Practice Note, p. 51, emphasis added.
83 Ibid., p. 59.
84 IDDRS 4.30, 4.10.
85 UN, United Nations Policy for Post-conﬂict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration
(New York: United Nations, May 2008), p. 13.
86 Sigrid Wllibald, ‘Does Money Work? Cash Transfers to Ex-combatants in Disarmament, Demobilisa-
tion and Reintegration Processes’, Disasters, 30:3 (2006), p. 326.
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minimise resentment; for example, quick impact projects and employment generation
schemes that allow ex-combatants and communities to interact and work side by
side.87 The resentment narrative is often presented as being static (communities will
resent special beneﬁts no matter what) yet these examples suggest that resentment is
contingent upon the overarching design and implementation of DDR interventions.
DDR’s demarcation between ex-combatant perpetrators and community victims
corresponds to Makau Mutua’s inﬂuential critique of human rights discourse, where
he identiﬁes a tendency to divide peoples into categories, pitting ‘savages, on the one
hand, against victims and saviors, on the other’.88 In DDR discourse, ex-combatants
are cast in the savage role (perpetrators to be resented), communities as victims
(blameless, innocent, bystanders to conﬂict and therefore above it), and international
actors as saviours (enlightened enough to ensure that DDR does not reward perpe-
trators or fuel resentment). Mutua argued that this discourse makes oppositional
binaries possible: superior and inferior (‘their ex-combatants’ versus ‘our veterans’),
and barbarity and civilisation (‘ex-combatant perpetrators’ versus ‘community vic-
tims’).89 Such constructions help DDR actors to mobilise resources by reassuring
donors that they will assist sympathetic victims and not savages alone. The community
is asserted to resemble the peacebuilding enterprise itself: liberal, peaceful, good. The
community is constructed as the saviour’s mimic, the civilised, good-hearted, coopera-
tive entity, the colonial mission’s reformed subject; the ex-combatant, in opposition,
becomes the object of mockery, the colonial mission’s threatening caricature.90
The tendency to demarcate post-conﬂict communities into separate categories of
victim and perpetrator suggests that the bodies of ex-combatants might be uniquely
‘docile’ during DDR interventions because, more so than other ‘war affected’ or
‘vulnerable’ groups like refugees or IDPs, who are framed as victims of conﬂict pro-
cesses, ex-combatants more closely align with Foucault’s prisoners because of their
construction as guilty perpetrators and potential menaces to society in need of reha-
bilitation.91 As a result, they risk becoming a repository into which the international
peacebuilding enterprise can dump its desires (to demarcate post-conﬂict populations
as victims or perpetrators), its fears (to ﬁx ex-combatants as frontline threats in the
‘coming anarchy’), and its interests (to conﬂate the return of ex-combatants to lives
of basic poverty with success, which distracts from the failure of the development
regime to lift combatant and non-combatant populations alike out of poverty). This
in turn underscores how (unintentional) stigmatisation of ex-combatants might prop
up the (intentional) agenda of neo-liberal peacebuilding. If ex-combatants do not
deserve long-term support, then peacebuilding interventions that favour ‘self-reliance’,
macroeconomic stability, and entrepreneurship are reinforced, whilst investment in
87 UNAMSIL, ‘The DDR Process in Sierra Leone: Lessons Learned’ (Freetown: UNAMSIL DDR
Coordination Section, 2003), p. 8.
88 Makau Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’, Harvard Interna-
tional Law Journal, 42:1 (2001), p. 201.
89 Ibid.
90 These labels are taken from Peter Childs and Patrick Williams, An Introduction to Postcolonial Theory
(London: Longman, 1996), p. 131; see also Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge,
1994), pp. 85–92.
91 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin New Ed edition,
1991 [orig. pub. 1975]).
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employment, public works, and state-provided welfare support to post-war popula-
tions are either deprioritised or else actively discouraged.92
In the Liberian context, the resentment narrative oversimpliﬁes the community’s
role during conﬂict. Where did Liberian ex-combatants come from, if not from ‘com-
munities’? In Voinjama, Liberia, each of a group of ten former LURD combatants
told me that their families and community leaders instructed and pressured them to
ﬁght.93 Four of these reported being violently recruited, but still cited the security of
their families and communities as a reason for their participation (‘If I did not join,
they would kill my family and friends’; and, ‘even though I was forced to ﬁght, it was
the best thing to provide security for my family’). Their individual experiences mirror
the conclusions of two surveys in which both ex-LURD and ex-MODEL said it
was for communities that they joined armed campaigns.94 For those young ﬁghters
violently coerced into ﬁghting, the community is also implicated in failing to prevent
their recruitment.
The community is deeply implicated in cycles of violence, and in each com-
batant’s journey from civilian to combatant and back to civilian. Communities
sustain complex structures not just of ﬁghters but also of conﬂict’s middlemen. As
Nordstrom observed of simple perpetrator/victim dichotomies that reduce conﬂict
to its constituent ‘combatants’:
When I hear people referring to a war in terms of two opposing forces – Frelimo and Renamo
in the case of Mozambique – as if that deﬁned the totality of the war experience, I am puzzled
and want to ask, ‘What about the blackmarketeers, the arms merchants, the civilian collabo-
rators, the roving predatory bands of quasi-soldiers and ex-militia, the mercenaries, the jackal
proﬁteers who sell information to both sides, the private militias, and the foreign strategists –
all of whom profoundly shape the dynamics of the war on the ground.’95
Moreover, communities can threaten ex-combatants after war; they can perpetuate
the corruption and discrimination that exploited and endangered youth prior to the
war.96 They can also, as was documented in the Hotspots, exploit and victimise ex-
combatants via illegal and exploitative labour schemes and extortion rackets.
The resentment narrative thrives despite the availability of destabilising counter-
narratives. One counter-narrative is that the nature of the relationship between com-
batants and communities is more nuanced than the resentment narrative allows.
After the conﬂict ended in Liberia, many ex-combatants from all factions migrated
to rubber plantation communities because of the economic opportunities that rubber
tapping presented. Ex-combatants (approximately 5,000 LURD ex-combatants at
Guthrie and 500 MODEL at Sinoe) used intimidation and violence to assume
92 See Mark Dufﬁeld, Security, Development and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007); Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner (eds), Whose Peace?
Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008); Oliver P. Richmond (ed.), Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and
Approaches (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); and Bob Deacon, Michelle Hulse, and Paul
Stubbs, Global Social Policy: International Organisations and the Future of Welfare (London: Sage,
1997).
93 Author’s interview with former LURD combatants, Voinjama, Liberia (16 April 2007).
94 Pugel, What the Fighters Say; Bøa˚s and Hatløy, ‘Getting In’.
95 Carolyn Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1997), pp. 46–7.
96 Joseph Hanlon, ‘Is the International Community Helping to Recreate the Conditions for War in Sierra
Leone?’ The Round Table, 94:381 (2005), pp. 459–72; Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-making
versus the Liberal Peace’, Cooperation and Conﬂict, 43:2 (2008), pp. 139–63.
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control of plantation management and production, or else assumed positions of
leadership within plantation security forces (for example, Taylor’s militia on Cocopa
plantation). Several plantation communities had good cause to resent ex-combatants.
A 2006 report from UNMIL’s Human Rights Section uncovered evidence of killings
and sexual violence on the plantations, as well as deplorable living conditions for
plantation residents. At Guthrie, in particular, plantation residents opposed the
ex-combatant presence until UNMIL successfully relocated them by inducing them
to join alternative vocational training programmes.
But on other plantations, the relationship between communities and combatants
was more complex. At Sinoe, MODEL ex-combatants had links and family members
already resident on the plantation, so the relationship between the ex-combatants
and the plantation community was one where violent intimidation co-mingled with
preexisting family and social ties connecting ex-combatants to non-combatant plan-
tation residents. Even though the Liberian government failed to identify the rightful
owners of Sinoe, the County Superintendent repeatedly tried to repossess it from
the Community Welfare Committee (CWC), the organisation that former MODEL
combatants had formed to manage Sinoe. The CWC, with support from the resident
plantation population, resisted the Sinoe Superintendent’s attempts. One such attempt,
in August 2008, led to violent confrontations between the CWC and the Super-
intendent’s representatives. The CWC’s nine core members were subsequently arrested
without indictment in October 2008 and detained illegally until February 2009. All of
their assets were seized, also illegally and without compensation after the nine men
were eventually released without charge. Additionally, plantation residents at Sinoe
(ex-combatants and non-combatants alike) were routinely forced to pay bribes for
concession rights and were illegally taxed for rubber processing. Numerous authorities
at local and state levels were known to receive such payments from other plantation
communities.97 On some plantations, then, culpability and victimisation were not
clear-cut: ex-combatants were both perpetrators and victims, with some communities
(Guthrie) resisting them but others (Sinoe) demonstrating a complex combination of
support, empathy, indifference, and opposition.
A second counter-narrative is that community resentment might not be as wide-
spread and deeply felt as suggested. The Bøa˚s and Hatløy survey found that in most
cases communities welcomed the return of ex-combatants.98 The majority of ex-
combatants also report feeling accepted by communities in Liberia. In a 2008 UNMIL
survey, 43 per cent of both ex-combatant and non-combatant respondents said
ex-combatants are viewed with acceptance, and another 20 per cent went further,
saying they are viewed with respect.99 Several ofﬁcials reported in separate interviews
in 2007 that reintegration assistance helped to mitigate social tensions rather than
exacerbate it.100 Ex-combatants also returned in high numbers (58 per cent) to
97 Information regarding plantations was obtained via author interviews with UNMIL ofﬁcials, ex-
combatants, Sinoe plantation residents, and local NGOs in Monrovia, Greenville, Sinoe County, and
Sinoe Rubber Plantation (June 2009), and at Guthrie Rubber Plantation (April 2007).
98 Bøa˚s and Hatløy, ‘Getting In’, p. 49; Jennings, ‘Struggle to Satisfy’, p. 52.
99 Hill et al., ‘Would You Fight Again?’ p. 5. See also Christian Bugnion, Luc Lafrenie`re, Sam Doe,
Hirut Tefferi and Cerue Garlo, External Mid-term Evaluation Report of the DDRP in Liberia (Monrovia:
UNMIL, 2 October 2006), p. 41.
100 Author’s interview with local county ofﬁcial, UNHCR coordinator, and NCDDRR ofﬁcial, Lofa
County (16 April 2007).
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home communities.101 These counter-claims match survey evidence from other DDR
processes, suggesting that resentment might be overstated across cases.102
A third counter-narrative is that communities often help, support, and protect
ex-combatants. The Hotspots found that several mining camps in Grand Gedeh and
River Gee were unwilling to reveal ex-combatant identities or share information
about them, with follow-up interviews stating that the cause for this unwillingness
was not fear of reprisal but rather a more symbiotic relationship between former
ﬁghters and communities. Fourth, ex-combatants are also capable of performing
conﬂict-mitigation and conﬂict-resolution roles in communities. As discussed in the
previous section, members of communities often have approached erstwhile com-
batant commanders to help solve problems involving the rank and ﬁle.
Assumption 2. Communities are more deserving
The resentment narrative also relies upon appeals to equity, warning that ‘too much’
assistance for one group (ex-combatants) is unfair and could fuel social tensions as
a result. But this argument is not premised upon equal entitlement to assistance
between ex-combatants and communities after war; rather, it subtly implies that
communities are more deserving of assistance than ex-combatants. At a conference
organised by the UK government for parliamentary leaders from developing states,
a prominent DDR consultant put it this way: ‘Ex-combatants are not the bene-
ﬁciaries [of DDR assistance]; communities are. Ex-combatants are the recipients.’103
Ex-combatants do not (and ought not) beneﬁt; they merely receive. The focus of
assistance, and therefore dessert, is the community. In constructions of dessert, com-
munities are granted agency over ex-combatants. Ex-combatants do not reintegrate;
communities reintegrate them.104
Dessert constructions neglect the heterogeneous makeup of communities and of
their experiences of conﬂict (different community members were affected differently
by war) and the variety of roles played by communities during and after war. They
also locate ex-combatants as outside of communities, and in so doing ‘produce dif-
ference by differing’.105 Yet Liberian ex-combatants are community members, too.
Bøa˚s and Hatløy emphasise how ‘typical’ they are: before the war, ex-combatants
‘lived quite ordinary Liberian lives’, and after the war were found to be ‘like’ other
Liberians: ‘poor, disenfranchised and without any access to or hope for upward
social mobility’.106 To attribute conﬂict to combatants alone negates ‘the crucial
role played through societal processes in the legitimation of war’.107
101 Pugel, What the Fighters Say, pp. 2, 5.
102 Peter Uvin, Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why They Joined, Why They Left, How They Fared, MDRP
Working Paper No. 3 (Washington, DC: World Bank, October, 2007), pp. 20–1.
103 International DDR consultant, conference panel, International parliamentary conference on peacebuild-
ing: tackling state fragility programme, London (30 Jan. 2010). The UNDP Practice Note says the
same thing (p. 11).
104 UNDP, Practice Note, pp. 34, 37.
105 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1982), p. 48.
106 Bøa˚s and Hatloy, ‘Getting In’, pp. 33, 42.
107 Vivienne Jabri, Discourses on Violence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 17.
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Follow-up programmes targeted both combatants and non-combatant com-
munity members. Community leaders chose who participated and who did not, and
were encouraged to include ex-combatants on the projects, as well as other special
target groups (for example, women). Yet several practitioners in Liberia mistakenly
assumed that follow-up assistance was for ex-combatants alone and accused UNMIL,
based on that assumption, of being ‘too obsessed with ex-combatants’.108 A joint
assessment commissioned by UNMIL, the World Bank, and UNDP included a
‘suggestion’ that public works projects ‘employ all youth irrespective of whether
they are former combatants or not’, even though this was precisely what the pro-
grammes were doing.109 Just as the threat narrative is totalising because it constructs
the ex-combatant as threat regardless of whether the ex-combatant is employed or
unemployed, the resentment narrative is similarly totalising because it stigmatises
reintegration programmes even when they include community members.
External construction of community dessert tends to turn the ‘ex-combatant’ label
into an epithet. Self-identiﬁcation as an ex-combatant is assumed to be bad, a truth
often presented as self-evident. A European UNDP ofﬁcial in Monrovia said,
In most countries, ex-combatants hide their identities. Here, people want to be identiﬁed as
ex-combatants, even those who were not ex-combatants. It is high time we stop that. We
need every member of the community to see the urgent need to contribute to the community
without discrimination, without regard to ex-combatant status, etc. That everyone in the
community feels that sense of involvement.110
This contrasts with a Liberian NCDDRR ofﬁcial, who said, ‘Ex-combatants do not
want to be referred to as such. After all, many were forced into war.’111 The difference
in these two opinions is accounted for by individuals’ strategic adoption of the label:
before a UNDP audience, it is advantageous to adopt the label in order to qualify for
beneﬁts.112 There is a programme on offer, with generous eligibility. Why would an
ex-combatant not assert his or her combatant status? Meanwhile, in the community
within which the NCDDRR ofﬁcial was embedded, the audience for ex-combatants
was localised, creating incentives to discard the label to emphasise social inclusion.
To talk of communities deserving beneﬁts more than ex-combatants underscores
the way in which communities can also wield the ex-combatant label as an epithet
for their own strategic reasons: to erase complicity for conﬂict, to scapegoat, and
to articulate grievances against the international aid establishment. Digging deeper,
however, communities often have complicated and contradictory feelings towards
ex-combatants. A second NCDDRR ofﬁcial said,
When something happens in a community, yes, ex-combatants are blamed occasionally, but
[scapegoating] is not prevalent. For example, I ask communities, ‘Name three of your best
friends.’ And then I ask if they were ex-combatants and they say yes . . . [Ex-combatants]
have formed family relationships with [communities], they have also intermarried. But when
tempers ﬂare, the term ‘ex-combatants’ does come up.
108 Author’s interview with UNICEF ofﬁcial, Monrovia (9 June 2009).
109 Harold J. Monger, Impact Assessment Report on Infrastructure for Employment Projects (Monrovia:
Ministry of Public Works, UNMIL, World Bank, and UNDP, 2008), p. 31.
110 Author’s interview with UNDP ofﬁcial, Monrovia (15 June 2009).
111 Author’s interview with NCDDRR ofﬁcial, Monrovia (9 June 2009).
112 Such strategic essentialism is well documented elsewhere: see Jessica Schafer, ‘A Baby Who Does Not
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410 Jaremey R. McMullin
When the community uses the term ‘ex-combatant’ as an epithet, it is possible that
the community is doing so to scapegoat ex-combatants for more general societal
problems. The application of ‘ex-combatant’ as a pejorative catchall to describe
criminality, idleness, and menace linked to community resentment repeats across
combatant contexts, albeit in different ways. That application, however, should be
contextualised not as evidence of resentment but instead as the general tendency of
many societies in the north and south to use epithets that express a generic distrust
of youth, be it the ‘long hairs’ of the 1960s or the ‘chavs’ of today.113
Examples of community solidarity with ex-combatants further destabilise the
resentment narrative. Some communities have rejected the labelling of ex-combatants
to protect them. Teachers and school administrators in Lofa County explained in
interviews in 2007 that they very carefully and purposefully referred to young ex-
combatants receiving educational assistance not as ‘ex-combatants’ but as ‘scholar-
ship students’, to reduce the separation of such beneﬁciaries from their peers.
Assumption 3. Community-based approaches are superior to targeted assistance
Advice to DDR practitioners frames community-based approaches to reintegration
in positive terms while negatively depicting ex-combatant-focused reintegration pro-
grammes.114 When the necessity of some targeted programming is asserted, it is
almost by way of apology, or justiﬁcation. The 2011 secretary-general’s report on
DDR states, ‘Programmes should move as quickly as possible from individual,
ex-combatant-focused reinsertion or reintegration to community-based reintegration:
or, where possible, immediately adopt a community-based approach.’115 The costs
of not adopting a community-based approach where ex-combatants and non-
combatant community members share beneﬁts are said to be high: ‘Failure to do
so will result in ex-combatants continuing to identify themselves as belonging to a
special group outside society, retarding their effective reintegration into local com-
munities.’116 An appeal to equity is predicated on the absence of parallel support to
communities.
The mid-term evaluation of DDR programmes in Liberia found that they were
unsustainable because there was ‘no overall national recovery and development
plan’ and ‘no parallel complementary programmes designed to operate at community
level’.117 My ﬁeld visits to Voinjama in Lofa County in 2007 and Greenville in Sinoe
County in 2009 corroborated that the most visible development assistance on offer was
attached to DDR programming (although, as stated previously, this targeted both
ex-combatants and non-combatant community members). Interviews with UNMIL
ofﬁcials veriﬁed that recovery assistance and development aid to communities affected
by war has been slow to reach remote areas in the border regions and mining and
plantation communities: poor infrastructure and insecurity were cited as the reasons.
The resentment narrative would reverse the logic of the mid-term evaluation: rather
113 Uvin, Ex-combatants in Burundi, p. 20; see also Owen Jones, Chavs: The Demonisation of the Working
Class (London: Verso, 2011).
114 UNDP, Practice Note, p. 52.
115 UNGA, A/65/741, para. 9. See also IDDRS 4.30.4.11.
116 UNDP, Practice Note, p. 5; see also IDDRS 4.30.4.11 and UNDP, Report on the Reintegration of
Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique (1992–1996) (New York: UNDP, 1997), p. 28.
117 Bugnion et al., Mid-term Evaluation, p. 37.
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than blame incomplete reintegration on the failures of the international development
regime, the lack of community assistance is blamed on DDR programmes. The
‘quick move’ from targeted to non-targeted approaches, therefore, becomes de facto
a euphemism for a move from internationally provided support to no support.
Given that spending on DDR programmes is a fraction of the overall develop-
ment portfolio of major donors, the resentment narrative fails to answer two ques-
tions. First, why are there not more post-conﬂict programmes assisting communities?
Second, why is community assistance the speciﬁc responsibility of DDR programmes
and not the general development mandate of UNDP, ILO, the World Bank, and
bilateral donors? With DDR often the only assistance on offer in remote communities,
resentment is said to be a function of the special assistance received by ex-combatants
rather than an indictment of the failure of the international development regime to
assist post-war communities. My suggestion is not that community-based programmes
are a bad idea: interviews with local UN staff and independent programme evaluations
of infrastructure employment projects both emphasised that having community
members work side by side with combatants enhanced integration and reconciliation.
The assumptions buttressing preferences for community-based programming, how-
ever, might further differentiate combatants from communities.
The case of Liberia, however, is also instructive about how hegemonic assump-
tions about short-term assistance for ex-combatants can be subverted, showing that
the same actors who disseminate narratives about community-based programming
are not monolithic. They also evidence the capacity to innovate and transform modes
of assistance. Although the Hostpots Assessments reify some tropes about ex-
combatants, they critically challenge others; they consistently articulate the need to
design follow-up programming to assist vulnerable ex-combatants in areas that
received little support during the formal DDR process. Within UNMIL, many actors
opposed the assumption that reintegration assistance should be short-term. Resisting
critics who said it was ‘doing development’ and over-prioritising ex-combatants,
UNMIL/RRR (with support from the World Bank, UNDP, and other actors) imple-
mented follow-up programmes targeting ex-combatants and non-combatants that
successfully employed over 70,000 Liberians for a total of 2.5 million working days,
showing that it is possible to design community-based interventions that do not
shy away from assisting ex-combatants. A 2010 high-level UN review of DDR con-
cluded, in part based on the success of RRR’s employment programmes, that more
resources and longer-term follow-up programmes for ex-combatants are needed.118
More broadly, the UN system is also moving towards recognition that longer-term
assistance for ex-combatants is needed. The secretary-general recommends at least
three years of UN reintegration assistance in his 2011 report.119
Conclusion: towards integration?
Neither the threat narrative nor the resentment narrative is benign; each enables
some viewpoints and objectives, and disables others. Each upholds an essential ex-
combatant otherness that distinguishes former ﬁghters from their post-conﬂict states
118 McCandless, Second Generation, p. 4.
119 UNGA, A/65/741, para. 26.
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and communities, and implies unique ex-combatant culpability for conﬂict and post-
conﬂict violence. As such, the frames are not just a matter of language but have a
power, politics, and violence all their own, impacting DDR programme duration
and contours, peacebuilding policy and strategy, and social relations between ex-
combatants and non-combatants. Of course, threats and resentment can sometimes
be the case; the problem is that DDR discourse tends to construct them as being
mostly or always the case. In this respect, they are totalising. The threat narrative
makes all ex-combatants dangerous, whether employed or unemployed. The resent-
ment narrative makes all ex-combatants unpopular, whether or not programmes
included their communities.
This article has demonstrated that the narratives negatively impact the integra-
tion process. First, both narratives absolve international and national actors of
responsibility. By naturalising the violent predilection of ex-combatants, the threat
narrative scapegoats them and frees international, national, and local actors of their
own complicity during conﬂict and post-conﬂict transition. The resentment narrative
blames DDR programmes for lack of community recovery assistance and not the
institutional and structural failures of the development enterprise. The juxtaposition
of community saints against combatant demons blames ex-combatants for the state’s
conﬂict and post-conﬂict woes and ignores the community’s role in producing and
sustaining the structures that ignite conﬂict.
Second, the propensity of DDR rhetoric to divide post-conﬂict societies into
perpetrators and victims is a form of ultimate othering. If everything ex-combatants
do after conﬂict is potentially threatening simply by virtue of their ex-combatant
status, then peace and success become equated not with ex-combatant visibility but
with invisibility. Othering of ex-combatants also homogenises the global south.
They are made to appear similarly threatening across very different post-conﬂict con-
texts. Ex-combatants in Liberia ¼ ex-combatants in Sierra Leone ¼ ex-combatants
in DRC ¼ ex-combatants in Burundi, etc. And, othering sustains divisions between
‘their’ ex-combatants from ‘our’ veterans. This becomes more evident when a close
look at conﬂict context reveals that recruitment and mobilisation patterns – as well
as the difﬁculties and challenges of return from war – for ‘their wars’ and ‘our wars’
are not as different as the narratives suggest; presumed distinctions between African
ex-combatants and Western veterans reify African exceptionalism in ways that are
meant to further separate ‘their wars (brutal) and our wars (civilized)’.120 The resent-
ment narrative others ex-combatants in ways that mirror ‘divide and rule’ strategies
of the colonial era. It ﬁxes them as alien to the community, and establishes an
in-group (the community) and an out-group (the ex-combatants).
Finally, the narratives rationalise securitised, short-term assistance. Assumptions
about ex-combatants as inherently threatening securitise DDR interventions speciﬁ-
cally and peacebuilding generally: they rationalise and justify reintegration assistance
only as long as ex-combatants constitute a security threat. Ex-combatants are worthy
of aid and relevant to peacebuilding only if they are threatening. Reintegration assis-
tance is consequently operationalised as short-term, meant only to ‘buy time’ and
‘facilitate security’ for the macroeconomic stability measures that are the long-term
120 Keen, ‘Tale of Two Wars’, p. 515.
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focus of reconstruction, development, and recovery. The community resentment narra-
tive discourages targeted approaches and yet does not articulate sustainable, interna-
tionally ﬁnanced and administered ‘community-based’ assistance, either. The contours
of such assistance are left vague.
These impacts of the threat and resentment narratives matter not just for Liberia
but also for other processes of post-conﬂict reintegration and reconciliation. If DDR
actors are to narrate new stories about ex-combatants that foreground their integra-
tion into communities rather than their separation from communities, a discursive
shift is needed. At the rhetorical level, space is needed to confront the social capital
of ex-combatants as a potential resource for the post-conﬂict state, and not simply a
problem. Together with non-combatants, they are the raw human material upon
which states necessarily rely to rebuild and reconcile. But shifts in DDR program-
ming are also needed. The UN’s endorsement of at least three years of reintegration
support is an important starting point in this regard. The suggestion that former
ﬁghters might beneﬁt from longer-term processes of assistance might also lead to
further debate about the different forms that assistance could take, in ways that
challenge macroeconomic orthodoxy and acknowledge the policy and academic
literature on DDR indicating that a shift towards labour-intensive strategies of rein-
tegration is needed.121
To redress the stigmatisation of ex-combatants, however, is not simply about
‘getting DDRR right’. Ex-combatants are not a resource for the post-conﬂict state
only if the state and its patrons design and implement the right programmes; rather,
ex-combatants’ own efforts to situate themselves within their state, their families, and
their communities make possible imaginative new ways to conceptualise and support
reintegration programmes. But aligning programmes with ex-combatant agency nec-
essarily insists as a ﬁrst step that actors problematise the stigma currently attached to
ex-combatants as programme beneﬁciaries.
121 UNGA, A/65/741, paras 41–5; UN Ofﬁce for West Africa, Youth Unemployment and Regional Insecurity
in West Africa (December 2005); Jennings, ‘Struggle to Satisfy’, p. 214.
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